Mar 27

(To read other “Facts Behaving Badly”, please click here.)

I want to open this post up by explain how you should go about finding a “Fact Behaving Badly”.

Step 1: Hear a fact. If you hear an incorrect fact once, it can’t do too much damage. But if you hear it more than once, from multiple sources, move to step 2.

Step 2: Ask yourself, is this fact too good to be true? Too ideologically perfect? Could a political consultant have designed this fact? If yes, move to step 3.

Step 3: Google the fact. Or go to snopes.com.

For example? The other day, a co-worker of mine told another co-worker the story behind his space pen. NASA spent over a million dollars engineering a pen that would work in space. Do you know what the Russians used?

A pencil!

Having heard this story more than once, I asked myself, “Man, this story sounds way too anti-government to be true.”

It isn’t. Almost nothing in the story is right.

NASA used pencils--mechanical pencils, not wooden pencils, because of the fire risk--for years. But “because of the substantial dangers that broken-off pencil tips and graphite dust pose in zero gravity to electronics and the flammable nature of the wood present in pencils” NASA looked for an alternative. The inventor of the space pen developed it independently, as a marketing gimmick, and gave samples to NASA. After testing the new pens, NASA bought them from the entrepreneurial inventor. Within a few years, the Russians adopted the space pen as well. (H/T to Snopes and the Space Review for the debunking.)

Ironically, the space pen is the ultimate example of entrepreneurial capitalism.

Perhaps you heard about those $16 muffins the Department of Justice bought a few years ago? Yeah, not true. What about the $200 hammers? The $600 toilets? Or the $10,000 coffee makers? (H/T to Freethoughtpedia.) Mostly, the media takes complex items--a combination tea maker/coffee maker/soup warmer designed to work at high altitude in the cramped confines of a bomber--and re-dubs them as something simpler--a coffee maker!--then runs the story under a breathless headline decrying government waste. (If you bought these myths, don’t feel bad; newspapers repeat them all the time. The $16 muffin tricked The LA Times, CBS and CNN, along with 178 other news sources.)

Some facts behaving badly are true, if you don’t caveat them. According to this guy, NASA did technically spend $10,000 on a toilet. But as the website points out, that kind of makes sense when failure--zero gravity fecal matter everywhere--could cost lives.

With all this talk of money, Michael C and I got in the mood to share five somewhat-foreign-policy-related economic “Facts Behaving Badly”.

Myth 1: China owns all of our debt.

Yeah, not so fast. Pundits, politicians and comedians have repeated this claim so many times that most Americans now accept it as gospel. Except China doesn’t own all of our debt. They don’t even own half of it. China has, approximately, 8% of the U.S. debt, (at the time of this writing) an amount so low I’m not sure the average American would ever guess it. Indeed, foreign governments, in total, only own 32% of the U.S. debt.

If China doesn’t own our debt, who does? The super rich. I’ll let Robert Reich take it away, “This huge structural change in how America's rich finance government--from paying taxes to lending money--has gone almost unnoticed.”

Myth 2: America Imports Most of Its Oil.

No. “The U.S. now imports 45% of its petroleum, down from 57% in 2008.” So the word “most” no longer applies.

Myth 3: America gets most of its oil from the Middle East.

Again, no. Most of the rest of that oil doesn’t come from the Middle East. In fact, 69% of our oil imports come from five countries. Only one--Saudi Arabia--is Middle Eastern; three of them--Canada, America’s biggest oil importer, Mexico and Venezuela--are North or South American.

(This great Politico article debunks some other gasoline myths.)

Myth 4: America must become “energy independent”.

Even if America did, it wouldn’t lower the price of gasoline. Why not? Well, Canada went “energy independent” years ago, and guess what? They still sell their oil on the international market. America has been “agriculturally independent” for years, but still sells its agricultural products on the world market too. To hear why, listen to NPR’s Planet Money.

Myth 5: America no longer makes anything.

Let’s watch an ABC series on buying American-made goods. Man, American manufacturing sure has plummeted!

Except, as this article by MSNBC, or this story by NPR’s Planet Money, or this other NPR piece, or this CATO blog post, or even this news article from...ABC itself?...explains that America still leads on manufacturing. And even when China passes America, America will still only be in second place.

The great change between the past and present is the number of manufacturing jobs. Frankly, American productivity has increased tremendously from even ten years ago. Productivity, and ergo profitability, have skyrocketed, while companies outsourced low wage/manual manufacturing to cheaper overseas factories or robots. This is an issue of what types of jobs and at what rates people are willing to pay for goods. But this shouldn’t mean America dives into protectionism over manufacturing.

Mar 25

Before Eric C and I started blogging, we didn’t realize how often we would be misread. I’m not talking about disagreements on points of debate; we expected those. No, I’m amazed how often people extrapolate wild positions based on one or two lines. In our N.Y. Times guest post “Where Did God Go in Afghanistan?”, some readers assumed I wanted the U.S. Army to force its soldiers to follow Christianity. (I definitely don’t.) The greatest example ever came from our (hopefully ironically-titled) post, “Join the Taliban...the Americans Will Kill You Anyways” when one reader assumed we were recruiting for the Taliban. (We weren’t.)

It happened again in “A New On V Game: Spot the Navy SEAL!”. I had a bit of fun at Marcus Luttrell’s expense for thinking growing a beard--in Army parlance “relaxed grooming standards”--would help him blend in with the locals. (In his exact words, “look like an Afghan fighter”.) The primary point of the post was to show how patently false this argument is.   

What I didn’t mean to argue was that soldiers shouldn’t let their hair fall down to their backs. As many commenters pointed out, beards help build rapport with local populations that, like in Afghanistan, that respect facial hair. Since I’ve never been much for uniformity in dress code in the first place, I’m not opposed to relaxing grooming standards; I just don’t think operators should grow beards under the mistaken belief they help them “blend in”.

If you want to build rapport go ahead. But do it right. While growing a beard may help build rapport, it’s one of the least effective ways to do it. A beard on someone who doesn’t speak the language is worth less than someone with a clean-shaven face who speaks Pashtun, Dari, Arabic or Farsi. (Also, the rapport reason is definitely abused by the special operations community. Most special operations units have relaxed grooming standards even if they don’t partner with local units or work with the local population.)

Here are a few even more effective ways to build rapport:

1. Learn the language. I deployed with a Special Forces battalion to Iraq. They used more interpreters than a regular Army battalion. The SF teams also spoke virtually no Arabic. Despite the widespread myth that Special Forces soldiers are fluent in multiple languages, most Special Forces Groups have not maintained even base proficiency in their assigned languages. (This applies even more for Special Forces Groups not aligned with the CENTCOM AOR.)

2. Live with your embedded troops. Even before the spate of “Blue on Green” attacks, most deployed military units lived in separate compounds. When I was deployed, this meant that U.S. troops shared a base with Afghan troops, but we lived in separate, walled off areas. How can you really build rapport if you don’t sleep and live together? You can’t. A beard won’t bridge the gap.

3. Invite Afghans to lift weights with you. Most Special Forces troops pride themselves on their huge muscles. If you don’t believe me, well, google “Special Forces workout”. (Or worse, “Navy SEAL workout”.) Yet I never saw Afghan or Iraqi soldier in a U.S. gym. If you want to build rapport, train and live together. (I also advocated in the last post that U.S. forces should work on slimming down. Sure you might have a beard, but giant muscles say to Afghans, “Remember, we’re different.”)

4. Use local weapons. Wear local clothes and Afghan military uniforms. Again, train as you fight. So why don’t our Special Forces use AK-47s, RPGs and the other weapons used by the Afghanistan National Army? Or wear the exact same uniform? It's about rapport, right?

5. Don’t wear your fancy Oakley sunglasses. If you want to build rapport, why not look the locals in the eyes without your glasses? Not making eye contact is disrespectful. And it lessens the perceived financial gap between our soldiers and Afghans. (This goes for your backwards baseball cap too.)

6. Recruit older Americans to meet with older Afghans. One of the completely offensive ways Americans interact with village elders is by having 20 to 30 year-olds fresh out of college leading meetings/shuras/jirgas. This is a personal bit of hypocrisy, because I led these meetings as a 20-year-old fresh out of UCLA. Of course, this means completely overhauling the U.S. military recruitment system--as Rosa Brooks recommended here--but it might have helped the U.S. win our last two wars.

7. Recruit more ethnic soldiers. Specifically, Pakistani, Iranian and Indian immigrants. This would cause a security clearance nightmare, but that probably says more about our security system process (developed during the Cold War) than reality.

8. Most importantly, don’t do anything that antagonizes the locals. I mean, will a beard help our troops one iota if the Afghans can see your “infidel” patch at the same time? Also, don’t talk about how uncivilized Afghans are. Don’t call all the locals terrorists. Hell, follow all the guidance in this post too.

Interestingly, when our last post went up, numerous special forces soldiers endorsed growing a beard, but not one advocated the entire military adopting relaxed grooming standards. If anything, most special operators who chimed in claimed I was jealous. I’m not jealous; I want our military to adopt effective fighting methods to win its wars. If growing a beard is so effective, every soldier in Afghanistan--not just Special Forces troops--should grow one.

Since every American unit in Afghanistan partners with Afghan units, every unit should reap the benefits of relaxed grooming standards, not just the special forces. And they should all follow this guidance before they start growing those beads.

Mar 19

When we last talked, I told you how I would have argued in favor of the motion, “Better Elected Islamists than Dictators”, a topic from Intelligence Squared U.S. from last fall. I laid out my argument along four points: this is about the long game, “let’s drop the -isms”, elections always trump dictators, and American foreign policy can be incredibly hypocritical.

Since I was not invited to this debate, I didn’t get to make those points. Today, I want to dissect the points that were argued in the debate. Consider this section my “in person rebuttals” to the debaters. (In fairness to the debaters, I had weeks to hone my arguments.)

Criticizing my side’s arguments:

Overall, from an intellectual standpoint, I liked my side’s main points. However, they didn’t really sell the audience on one key takeaway. Without one (and only one) take away, it’s hard to win an Intelligence Squared debate.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, arguing my side (for the motion), immediately linked the argument to terrorism...which is something I would have avoided. When challenged during the debate portion, I would have described how free and open elections help stamp out terrorism, but I wouldn’t have led with it. Here’s what Gerecht said:

“...better dictatorship forever than allow the Muslim common man, woman to elect Islamists in a free vote. Now, that's a pretty, I think, ironic position for them to take, because what they're essentially saying is they want to perpetuate the political systems which have allowed Islamic fundamentalism, including its most radical offshoots, jihadism, most famously al-Qaida, to actually grow stronger.”

Gerecht pulled this big gun out too soon. You just can’t give the other team time to counter it (which they did). By leading with it, the other side was able to (deceptively) criticize this position.

Gerecht also brings up Turkey in an excellent example of Islamists winning at the ballot box. A lot of this debate hinged on which side provided better examples, and this is a good one. The military ruled Turkey for years, then the Islamists took over. As Gerecht pointed out, the sky didn’t fall. The sky isn’t falling. And it doesn’t look like it will fall. Sure, Turkey’s Islamists aren’t perfect, but they are better than military dictatorships by a long margin...and they haven’t inspired Islamism either.

Brian Katulis also emphasized in his introduction that democracy and Islam are compatible. The key to any Intelligence Squared debate is to define the motions on your terms. He does that here. He also mentions the terrible actions of Moammar Gaddafi. I would have brought up Saddam Hussein too. Why did we go to war with Saddam if we should have embraced him as an ally? The opposition--which basically argued this ironic position--wasn’t forced to respond to this.

How I would have attacked my opponents:

In his introduction (in the transcript and on YouTube; not in the podcast), Rob Rosenkranz captures this (apparent) conundrum of supporting dictatorship, “the pro of dictatorship is a lot of these dictators are fairly reliable allies.” This has an incredibly easy counter: would Hitler have made an excellent ally? If rebels rose up to overthrow him, as he was committing a genocide, would you have supported him if he helped America fight the Communists? In this alternate history, I guess Rob Rosenkranz would say, “If he’s a reliable ally.”

To any clever internet debaters are out there saying, “Sure, bring up Hitler. That’s a crappy way to win a debate”: that rule doesn’t apply if the debate actually is about dictators, because you can’t discuss dictators without discussing Hitler. And you’ll lose a debate on dictators if you don’t bring him up.

Which the other side promptly did! Daniel Pipes argued that Islamism is the most reprehensible ideology ever created. In his words, “I think that the Islamists, whether elected or not, whether violent or not, Islamists of any sort whatsoever are barbarians, are totalitarians, are far worse than dictators.” Pipes went on to--brilliantly and academically disingenuously--distinguish between ideological dictators and “greedy dictators”. In the ideological camp he parked, you guessed it, Hitler, Stalin and “Islamists”.

This should be an incredibly awkward point, that one side supports mass murdering dictators. Ironic, hypocritical and argument-destroying. However, my side in the debate never crushed the other side with it. That’s why, ultimately, I think they lost.

Worse, the other side got away with it because of its sheer audacity and inaccuracy. Americans have forgotten the threat of fascism, are forgetting the threat of communism and now only live in fear of terrorism, er, Islamism. As a result, “Islamism” somehow becomes worse than tyranny and dictatorship. “Islamism” is somehow killing Americans regularly...when it isn’t. At all.

Frankly, on the spot, I would have trouble with this accusation. In hindsight, I would play up this myopia. I would also bring up examples of the benefits of democracy, and the threat of dictatorship. I would hope, though, had I been there, that, for the rest of the debate, I would destroy this distinction. Every dictator is ideological; every dictator slaughters his people to keep power; every American who supports dictators spits on the Constitution.

My side didn’t. But the pro-dictatorship side came out swinging in this debate. They helped the audience believe the impossible, that supporting dictatorships makes you a good American. Or that, somehow, the U.S. can encourage democracy in the Middle East, intervene to stop Islamists from winning the elections (how again?), and not create more terrorists along the way for meddling.

As a result, the correct side lost this debate.

Mar 12

Eric C and I are NPR junkies. (He started it.) And one of my favorite shows is Intelligence Squared US. Host John Donvan throws down an Oxfordian challenge to two sets of debaters to argue topics ranging from banning college football to genetically engineered babies. I love it--especially compared to cable news coverage--because the panelists go very deep into topics I often don’t know much about.

That was not the case for their topic last fall, “Better Elected Islamists Than Dictators”.
   
(Spoiler alert: If you haven’t listened to the above episode and actually care about who wins and loses, don’t keep reading.)

When it comes to the Arab Spring, I have pretty strong feelings. That’s why we spent weeks discussing this topic in January. To be clear, I am wildly for the proposition; elected Islamists are better than dictators. Always. I believe that everyone around the world is entitled to democracy, not just America.

As I listened to the debate, I started to get worried. My side let the other side set the terms. The opponents then leveraged the politics of fear to their advantage. I kept yelling at the podcast, “No, you should have said this! Don’t concede that! Say that’s a lie!” Since they didn’t...

My side lost.

But my side didn’t just lose, they got trounced. They started off with more supporters (38% of the audience), but only ended up with 44%. The opponents went from 31% of the audience to a whopping 47% supporting their side. For Intelligence Squared, that’s a walloping.

Which really hurts because this topic is probably the neatest summation of the entire “Arab Spring” issue. I mean, you could say, “Arab Spring, good or bad?”, but phrased this way, it really captures the nuance of the various positions. Considered among other foreign policy topics--the rise of China, Russia’s ongoing stuff--- this is far and away the most important change going on in the world.

As I’ve said before on this blog, I hate losing political arguments. (If I haven’t said that before, well I do.) So today and Wednesday, I want to set the record straight. On Wednesday, I will critique the arguments my side made during the debate. But first, four key points explaining why elected Islamists are better than dictators that my side left out:

1. This is about the long game. As long as the U.S. pursues short-term interests (which means installing dictators) over the long term (advancing democratic ideals), it will always have fractured relationships. This was true in the Cold War, and it has been true since 9/11. Pursuing a short term strategy will always keep America in danger.

The best example is the CIA’s involvement in Iran. The elected Iranian government in the 1940s started nationalizing oil, so, with Western help, the Shah took over. Ever since, the Iranians have resented American meddling in their country (including Western support of Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war). In each case, the US favored actions that benefited us in the short term, but have kept the problems with Iran continuing.

2. Let’s drop the “isms” argument. The opponents, as I’ll describe on Wednesday, managed to connect Islamism to fascism and Hitler. Well played, though totally inaccurate. On its face, this motion scares Americans with the dangerous sounding, “Islamism” and its connection to terrorism. This is on its face absurd, and I would make that point much more clearly.

3. Elections trump dictators absolutely. If I were debating on Intelligence Squared, I would have told a story that personifies this for the audience. I would have emphasized what it was really like to live under a dictator, asking the audience to imagine themselves with relatives disappearing to secret prisons and living under the crushing hand of dictatorship. If the other side wants to use fear, then pound them back with tragedy and horror.

4. Emphasize the hypocrisy. The problem with American foreign policy is that, to pursue American interests--variously either pro-American business policies or protecting American lives--American foreign policy often asks other people to sacrifice their liberty. In essence, to keep Americans free, we ask that others live in tyranny. Otherwise, how could any American argue that dictators are good for the people of those countries? This hypocrisy is the primary criticism of American foreign policy around the globe, and the primary driver of hostility towards Americans.

More than anything else, supporting the “Arab Spring” is a moral issue. Any American who believes in freedom, liberty and the pursuit of happiness--for all mankind as the Declaration of Independence clarifies--must support the Arab Spring. You cannot rail against tyranny in America while supporting tyranny abroad. Doing so is either the height of arrogance, hypocrisy, ignorance or all three.

Feb 28

(A note before we begin: The Infinity Journal issue extensively cited and quoted below does have one article by Professor Beatrice Heuser that--in line with an intellectual tradition of B.H. Liddell Hart, John Keegan and Hew Strachan among others--describes how many of Clausewitz’ original ideas are borrowed, incomplete or wrong. Heuser specifically says Clausewitz shouldn’t be considered a prophet, but one voice among many.

Exactly.)

Yesterday, I described self-labeled “Clausewitzians” as an intellectual movement that verges on cultish. When a leader’s work only makes sense when it is “read properly”, well, that sounds more religious than intellectual.

My worries about Clausewitz don’t end there, though. Reading The Infinity Journal special issue dedicated to Clausewitz, I couldn’t help but spot several intellectual “red flags”, giant warning signs that say, “These Clausewitzians aren’t analyzing so much as adhering to Clausewitz at all costs.”

Red Flag 1: Clausewitz Is Never Wrong

Many intellectuals and historians blamed Clausewitz, in part, for World War I. (Specifically, On Violence favorite, John Keegan.) The thinking went, since the belligerents on all sides, especially the Germans, read Clausewitz, would have called themselves Clausewitzians, and tried to apply his ideas, the tremendous waste of life and energy that was World War I rests partly on his shoulders. I mean, if a Chief of Staff of the German Army writes a foreword to the fifth edition of Von Kriege, can he safely be called a Clausewitzian?

Not according to Clausewitzians. One author in the Infinity Journal specifically claims that German officers followed Clausewitz but misunderstood his key points. So again, “read properly” Clausewitz explains why even though avowed Clausewitzians acted as they believed Clausewitz would have advised, it isn’t actually Clausewitz’ fault. This same hindsight allows his followers to assert that every war adheres to his dictums. In the words of William F. Owen, “Clausewitzians are not confused about war, warfare and strategy because they read a book that explained about 90% of what could be usefully explained.”
   
Except for the German leaders who read his book? Time and time again Clausewitzians refuse to accept the limits of On War, and instead blame the readers. If a book tends to mislead it readers, it’s the books fault, not the readers.

Red Flag 2: You Can’t Criticize Clausewitz Unless You Agree with Clausewitz

William F. Owen’s article in the Infinity Journal, “To Be Clausewitzian”, has this delicious counter-intuitive:

“Additionally, and perhaps ironically, you can really only understand where Clausewitz fell short when you understand the real genius in what he got right.”

It isn’t ironic; it’s stifling. It means Clausewitz is impervious to criticism. Clausewitzians love this logic, like J Wolfsberger commenting on the SWJ council:

"I agree, he can't possibly be picking on CvC, since he either never read him, or didn't comprehend what he read."

If only those who agree with Clausewitz can understand Clausewitz, it isn’t an intellectually robust theory.

Red Flag 3: On War in Hindsight Explains Every War Perfectly

In hindsight, On War is 100% accurate. [Emphasis mine]

“Additionally On War more than adequately explains Israel’s lack of success in the 2006 Lebanon War, as does his work for the outcome in any conflict. Various analysts may pontificate, and argue, but Clausewitzians will not be confused.”

Apparently, Clausewitz works perfectly in hindsight. Though, as the German Army in World War I and U.S. Army in the 1980s examples show, it hardly ever works out before the war.

Red Flag 4: If You Don’t Accept Clausewitz, You Are Wrong

“Indeed one can be rightly suspicious of anyone who indulges in military or strategic thought who is not well grounded in On War.

Interpretation: Be suspicious of George C. Marshall, who didn’t read Clausewitz. (He also prepared the U.S. for war in Europe and the Pacific fairly well, without reading Clausewitz.)

Red Flag 5: On War Has Huge Problems

As William F. Owen himself admits this; something better can exist. He describes Clausewitz’ masterpiece as too long, deliberately confusing, and unfinished at the time of his death. This shows the rather obvious counter to Clausewitz worship: a simpler, better work explaining war could exist.

Does that sound like a writer who has “90% of all war” figured out?

Red Flag 6: Clausewitz Might Encourage War

In this long essay which kicked off one of the Small Wars Journal discussion threads I relied on for these posts, William Astore bemoans what might be the biggest problem with Clausewitz:

“Unlike a devastated and demoralized Germany after its defeats, we decided not to devalue war as an instrument of policy after our defeat, but rather to embrace it. Clasping Clausewitz to our collective breasts, we marched forward seeking new decisive victories."

This might be the most damning problem of Clausewitz. Try as they might to claim that everyone from current generals to the post-Vietnam generals to John Keegan to the German military before 1914 was simply misreading Clausewitz, Clausewitizians should admit that Carl von Clausewitz lends himself to misinterpretation. Tragically (maybe horrifically), this misinterpretation encourages nations to see war as a simple extension of policy, not a moral or ethical dilemma of the largest measure.

To reiterate a final time: those studying strategy, international relations and military history should, nee must, read Carl von Clausewitz. However, Clausewitz is not the alpha and omega, not the be all end all, not the beginning and ending of strategic thought. So-called “Clausewitzians” should not forget that.

Feb 27

Yesterday two words in my quote of Dr. Colin Gray stood out, “read properly”.

“Read improperly”, the writings of Clausewitz are incomprehensible garbage; “Read properly” On War reveals the inexorable truth behind all war and strategy for all of time.

Sorry, I don’t buy it.

“Read (or interpreted) properly” is the same refrain mystics, seers, prophets and oracles have used for millennia when their predictions don’t come true. They are what true believers say to defend the indefensible. Which is why, looking at the slavish attachment of some Clausewitz devotees, I think Clausewitzians are true believers.

“Read properly” isn’t the only red flag. Take this quote by William F. Owen writing in an Infinity Journal issue dedicated solely to the greatest German soldier-turned-philosopher:

On War stands tall because no other work of military thought gives such correct and useful guidance. Beyond anything else, ‘Clausewitzians’ do not just study Clausewitz’s On War out of academic interest. They use it as the basis of their thinking.”

Yikes, two more giant intellectual red flags. First, ‘Clausewitzians’ have their own moniker that distinguishes them from other military strategists. Sure, other fields have categories. International relations, for instance, has “realists”, “constructivists”, “neo-cons” and “liberals”. International relations, though, doesn’t depend solely on one thinker who’s been dead for a hundred and fifty years. Even more worrying is the last sentence, the cultish sounding, “They use it as the basis for their thinking.”

Wow.

I don’t use the word “cult” lightly. Clausewitzians don’t just follow Clausewitz,...they adhere to him. They believe he has all the answers...when he doesn’t. They insist he is infallible...except when he isn’t, when they blame it on not “reading him properly”. While cults are normally religious organizations, the same fanaticism can apply to intellectual endeavors.

Take Ayn Rand’s objectivists. The reverent tones which Rand’s followers use to describe her ideas mirror those of the Clausewitzians. The most penetrating analysis comes from Michael Shermer writing in Skeptic magazine about Ayn Rand. He has written about multiple cultish movements--like holocaust denial, scientology, climate change denial and creationism--but this article about Ayn Rand’s followers has a quote that applies equally well to “Clausewitzians”:

“[Objectivism] is a lesson in what happens when the truth becomes more important than the search for truth, when final results of inquiry become more important than the process of inquiry, and especially when reason leads to an absolute certainty about one’s beliefs such that those who are not for the group are against it.”

While Clausewitz’ doesn’t have an organization dedicated solely to his beliefs, “Clausewitzians” practice the worship, veneration and belief in the inerrancy of their intellectual leader that cults demand. Reading the Clausewitzian adherents, its hard not to come away with the feeling that Clausewitz has it all figured out. What do you think, William F. Owen?

“Just because stupid people mis-quote Clausewitz and do not understand him, does not make CvC not incredibly useful - and no one has ever done better!”

As Michael Shermer points out in his article about cults, the search for truth is more about the process, not about the answers. Clausewitzians have all the answers. I advocate reading Clausewitz as a starting point on the road to intellectual discovery, not the end point. Clausewitzians don’t. That’s where we disagree.

Tomorrow I’ll revel in some other quotes that should make you question anyone who calls themselves a “Clausewitzian”.

Feb 26

I’ve been accused by some people of hating Carl von Clausewitz (specifically for “slaying Clausewitzian strawmen”). Let’s go to the tape to see what I originally wrote about CvC:

"I don’t mean to slander Carl von Clausewitz here, nor do I intend to imply no one should read him. I advocate a middle ground: military officers should definitely read Clausewitz, but keep an open mind that he probably doesn’t have all the answers, or even most of them. No other intellectual field relies so heavily on one single thinker..."

I don’t hate CvC; I merely believe that military strategy and the study of war rely much too heavily on one thinker. And have no doubt, American military science/strategic studies relies too much on Clausewitz. Some have called it a “German fetish”, and I can’t disagree. Take Dr. Colin Gray writing about military theory [pdf] in the Strategic Studies Quarterly :

“A true glory of the three preeminent classics of strategic thought—Clausewitz’s On War, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, and Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War—is that they tell us all that we need to know about war’s unchanging nature. Read properly, they explain the nature of all war in all periods, among all belligerents, employing all weapons, and deploying an endless array of declared motives."

The Infinity Journal dedicated an entire article to Clausewitz, with pretty much the same thesis:   

“When it comes to the study of war and strategy--and despite the vast array of writings penned by brilliant men and women, both historical and contemporary--at the center of it all we still find Clausewitz...The result was success in the formulation of the foundations of a theory of war and strategy that no other theorist has before or since been able to rival...as far as observing, comprehending, and demonstrating via writings the fundamentals of war, Clausewitz is as close to a level of perfection as any theorist of war and strategy has so far been able to reach.”

At first, this seems reasonable. One thinker (Clausewitz), or three (Thucydides and Sun Tzu as well), have completely understood, defined and explained military strategy to their readers. But stop for a moment to really ponder this sentiment. Has one person ever dominated a field as thoroughly as Carl von Clausewitz? The Infinity Journal’s A.E. Stahl says they have:

“When we reflect on other areas of complex interests and activities, we can confidently...point to a number of intellectual giants that have conquered a wide array of vital subjects. They have graced posterity with considerable understanding and guidance that we rarely question.”

Except that’s entirely not true.

Take this list of the founders or kings of various academic disciplines:

Evolutionary biology                  Darwin

Genetics                                  Mendel

Psychology                               Freud

Behavioral Psychology               Pavlov

Realist Political Philosophy        Machiavelli

Liberal Political Philosophy        Locke

Economics                                Adam Smith

Physics                                     Copernicus then Newton then Einstein

Chemistry                                 Lavosier and Dalton

Philosophy                                Socrates and Plato

Each of the founders of these fields--I could call them the “one namers”--while still read, glorified and occasionally worshipped, no longer dominates their field, having been replaced by other theories, schools of thought and thinkers. Many of their original ideas have since been debunked or completely reworked.

Let’s start with the best example, Darwin. He literally created the theory of evolution, found evidence proving it, and popularized it. But biologists are not Darwinists. I’ll let John Rennie, editor in chief at Scientific American, rebuking the documentary No Intelligence Allowed, explain:

“The term [Darwinism] is a curious throwback, because in modern biology almost no one relies solely on Darwin's original ideas—most researchers would call themselves neo-Darwinian if they bothered to make the historical connection at all because evolutionary science now encompasses concepts as diverse as symbiosis, kin selection and developmental genetics."

Darwin didn’t know about or describe bottleneck evolution, gene flow, punctuated equilibrium, and so on. You won’t find On The Origin of Species assigned in a biology class as a textbook. And all of this ignores Alfred Russel Wallace, who developed a theory of natural selection contemporaneously to Darwin.

Or take Freud, who Wikipedia calls “the father of psychoanalysis”, and who most Americans call the founder of modern psychology. Many, if not most, of his ideas have been completely disavowed.

Think about non-science fields. Contemporary textbooks explain every topic from anthropology to sociology. You don’t read writing manuals from the 15th century, you read The Elements of Style by Strunk and White. (And now modern writing teachers disavow that text.) So far, in my economics course at UCLA’s Anderson School of Management, I haven’t seen a copy of The Wealth of Nations. However will I learn modern economics?

This applies to the humanities as well. One couldn’t overturn, say, the work of Herodotus, the first historian. His history still stands. Agreed, except that the study of history has evolved dramatically since the time of ancient Greece. Few history professors would recommend their students emulate his work habits or cite his history as fact; he’s been surpassed. So science, social science and the humanities have all evolved beyond what their preeminent founders believed.

Except the study of strategy. Doesn’t that seem...wrong? Did one 18th century philosopher really get it all completely right, and everyone else just pales in comparison?

Probably not. Clausewitz wrote important things about strategy that modern officers could use. But self-proclaimed “Clausewitzians” hold up Carl von Clausewitz to a level of religious zealotry that I will address tomorrow.

Feb 20

(Today's guest post is by Austin Bodetti, who attends the Hopkins school in New Haven and has an avid interest in military history. If you would like to guest write for us, please check out our guest post guidelines.

Quick note: The views of guest writers are not necessarily the view of Michael C or Eric C. For our take, please check out the comments below.)

From the Vietnam War to the Wars on Drugs and Terror, the United States of America has never stopped searching for pitched battles (i.e. guaranteed victories), yet even the most decisive of these battles mean nothing in terms of counterinsurgency. After the Tết Offensive, the Việt Cộng (vc) ceased to be a problem for the United States Army, but the US Army ceased to have popular support. Today is no different: the Battle of Baghdad and Fall of Kabul yielded similar results to Tết in the long term. Among all the lessons that the Vietnam War, Iraq War, and War in Afghanistan offer, nowhere in American history is there an example of the opposite, a case where guerillas had the means to defeat the counterinsurgent in pitched battle. Exceptions in warfare fall, as always, to the French.

Before the us Army fought the VC, the French Far-East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO), led by Henri Eugène Navarre 1953–4, fought the Việt Minh. Navarre lacked the tactical genius of opponent Võ Nguyên Giáp; unlike the previous commander in chief Raoul Albin Louis Salan, Navarre had little experience in leadership. He was an intelligence officer thrown the job of leading four hundred thousand Frenchmen, Indochinese, and North Africans, and he blamed his problems on communists in Paris, who blamed the First Indochina War on him. It was this unremarkable man whom the French Fourth Republic and its American ally expected to succeed where six of France’s best generals had failed. It was he who would fail most remarkably of all.

The French high command proposed to Navarre a project that Salan had begun. In 1953’s Operation Castor, Salan had captured a large piece of Việt-Minh territory, where he established a sixteen-square-mile stronghold in a ravine outside the city Điện Biên Phủ. This base had two airstrips, enough artillery to flatten Vietnam, and a 10,800-man garrison, largely legionnaires and paratroopers.Para commander Marcel ‘Bruno’ Bigeard declared, ‘Dien Bien Phu est imprenable!’ and each of Navarre’s American advisors agreed. When Giáp attacked Điện Biên Phủ—he would have to attack since it was the honorable, French thing to do—the cefeo would be so ready that all Giáp’s men might die on the spot. The Americans liked this idea.

Neither the Americans nor Navarre expected Giáp to be an admirer of Napoléon Bonaparte, who first earned fame dragging artillery a few miles across the Alps. Giáp dragged his artillery all the way from Beijing. He shelled the French March through May 1954, when they surrendered…legionnaires, paras, and all. Giáp’s artillery, what ensured his victory, did not cross the Sino–Vietnamese border on his back. Thousands of peasants, communist and nationalist alike, offered to carry ammunition and food hundreds of miles by truck, by bicycle, and most often by foot. Plus, Giáp had forty-eight thousand soldiers, all volunteers, to the cefeo’s 10,800 professionals.

The French had better soldiers. They had better weapons. They even had Bigeard, called the greatest para in history. Decades later, Giáp would write the book People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, where he described how guerillas could defeat a Western country as long as they had popular support. This support the French lacked, and five thousand reinforcements airdropped by Central-Intelligence-Agency pilots were never going to get it. The situation became so dire that the CIA proposed Operation Vulture: the US Air Force would nuke Việt-Minh positions around Điện Biên Phủ with British and French support. The French agreed. The British, who have long understood the nuances of counterinsurgency, did not. They saw that the First Indochina War was no Malayan Emergency, which the British had quelled by promising the Malays independence. The French had refused independence to the Khmers, the Laos, and the Vietnamese for the Indochina War’s eight years, and turning Điện Biên Phủ into Hiroshima would change nothing.

Like Giáp, Navarre wrote a book about his experience, where he blamed the defeat not on his own errors and those of the French in general but on communists in Paris, who continued to haunt him till his death in 1983. Bigeard, on the other hand, applied the lessons from the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ in French Algeria, where he earned the love of civilians (Arab as well as French) and the respect of his enemy. Somehow, America has spent the last sixty years studying Điện Biên Phủ without learning to do the same.