The last time I brought up contractors, I asked hyperbolically, "Are military contractors (nee mercenaries), immoral?" My answer was yes, because of the fraud, waste and abuse endemic to the system.
A "spirited" debate followed with poster Mark over the amenities offered on super FOBs (Forward Operating Bases). I loathe the existence of Green Beans, Burger King, and Salsa Night on bases like Bagram Airfield. He and Gunslinger pointed out that the funds that support these places are not the same that, for example, procure Hescos or build infrastructure. They're right, but I will never like the fact that we support 30,000 troops who conduct zero patrols, and mostly work five days a week.
But as Mark pointed out in the comments--and was reported by a variety of news sources--General McChrystal has decided to drastically limit the accoutrement on these bases. The reason, as the guys at Ink Spots point out, is that logistically Afghanistan can only support so many programs. And unfortunately the patties of Burger King and the espresso of Green Beans have to go.
I think the best quotes come from this BBC piece. "This is a war-zone, not an amusement park," the blog written by Command Sergeant Major Michael T. Hall says. "In order to accommodate the troop increase and get refocused on the mission in hand, we need to cut back on some of the non-essentials." As McChrystal says, "[the extra amenities] served as a distraction to the military mission." The word "distract" perfectly describes the situation.
To help shed some light on the subject, Starbuck over at Wings Over Iraq pointed us towards these two, somewhat older articles. The first by Max Boot--who I don't always agree with--wonders whether the US Army has actually mastered the logistics issue of warfare, but has gone too far. He quotes the old aphorism, "amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics," then lampoons it with modern day examples.
Mountain Runner--a good regular read--agreed and makes a very good point: the worst part of Burger Kings and Salsa Night is that they create a "little America" mindset. This echoes the ideas of The Ugly American, who harped on the lack of American cultural understanding, with our modern issues.
And since military contractors/military acquisitions continue to provide delightful stories of ineptitude, we'll finish today's post with some of the more ridiculous recent news about our favorite people:
- It looks like Secretary Gates finally overhauled the senior mentor's program. This program allowed retired Generals to triple dip in both retirement pay, contracting work, and government consulting.
- And in a follow up to our post from our last contractor link dump, the draw down in Iraq is being mismanaged by contractors. If you want to know why we oppose contracting, it is because they over-charge the government when they can.
- And finally, our favorite villain, KBR. The federal government recently sued KBR over contract fraud for the Iraq war. And since everyone wants a piece of them, some soldiers are suing KBR saying they knowingly allowed US Soldiers to be exposed to carcinogens.
The last time I brought up contractors, I asked hyperbolically, "Are military contractors (nee mercenaries), immoral?" My answer was yes, because of the fraud, waste and abuse endemic to the system.
Quick heads up:
Eric C just had two guest posts published this week. The first is over at Unique Blog titled, "Bad News: The Gatekeepers Still Exist." Eric C likes this post, it's an analysis of new media vs. old media.
Eric C also had a guest post published on MaxBlogger. It's kind of conceited, and Eric promises it isn't his fault.
Check them out.
On a hot day in the spring of 2008, my platoon manned a routine traffic control point in Eastern Afghanistan. It was us, a small group of Afghan Border Police, miles of empty countryside, and a trickle of civilian vehicles.
As soon as I got my men into position, I went to the nearest compound to set up an impromptu shura. After a bit of coaxing, I finally got the eldest male to come out of his dwelling. He matched the physical description of a key Taliban sub-commander, and he acted suspicious. He even told me his name--the same name as the Taliban sub-commander. (This may seem odd, but our battalion had already captured three known Taliban throughout the deployment, all because they used their real name. Afghans will lie for hours about what they do, but they always seem to use their real name. More on this interesting phenomena in future posts.)
Part of me was worried: the Taliban sub-commander I was looking for traveled with an entourage of 20-50 armed fighters. Luckily, we had an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) overhead. Linked to our Brigade headquarters, who had direct communication with my battalion headquarters, that in turn was linked to my company command post, who could talk to me on an FM radio, the UAV spotted the Taliban posse heading towards my position.
My commander radioed, “Destined 4-6, be prepared, Brigade says they spotted 100 Taliban moving towards your position. Current location at grid XXX-XXX.”
My platoon jumped into action, thankful that network-centric warfare had provided us the early warning.
What amazing technological network allowed this to happen? A variety of systems with equally convoluted acronyms: I plotted the Taliban position on a map system called the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below, or FBCB2. The FBCB2 links into another system called the Command Post of the Future, or CPoF. In addition to those two networks, every command post uses email, internet chat, and adobe chat. And to watch everything, the US Army has unmanned aerial vehicles; drones that can travel hundreds of miles, and hover over the battlefield for hours.
These networks allow Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels to (micro) manage fights in ways they never could before, as they were on that hot day in the spring of 2008.
As I worked with my company commander to identify the exact location of the Taliban entourage, my platoon sergeant got my men ready. My section sergeant put our sharpshooter in position, and repositioned the squad automatic weapon. My team leaders checked weapons and ammunition. We were on edge; we were ready.
I, meanwhile, checked the coordinates Brigade had relayed. I looked up. I checked again. I rechecked.
My platoon sergeant called me on the radio. “Sir, I don’t think those grid coordinates are correct.”
“No, they're right,” I replied. “The UAV is just looking at a herd of sheep.”
And so they were. "Network-centric" warfare isn't a panacea for counter-insurgency, or war in general. It doesn’t cut through fog of war, so much as allow the fog to creep up to levels previously unimaginable. The US Army constantly praises its small unit leaders for their initiative, but it then develops technology so that Generals can call in air strikes and micromanage the fight.
I don’t mean to discount all UAVs, or all communication advances, that combine to make our new "network" technology. But very few technologies have made life easier for the companies on the ground, the level where counter-insurgencies are waged. I'm not anti-technology; I am anti-micromanagement.
(A note on Operational Security: Many of the details in this story could be fleshed out because I have to keep some names and capabilities secret. I hope everyone understands. Also, this dialogue is not accurate but an approximation.)
(Today's guest post is by Matty P. If you would like to guest write for us, please check out our guest post guidelines. We look forward to publishing reader posts on future Thursdays.
Quick note: The views of guest writers are not necessarily the view of Michael C or Eric C. For our take, please check out the comments below.)
I have chosen to forgo my scheduled post on why Top Gun is one of the top 30 Naval Avionics films of all time (just above Iron Eagle 9: Navy Planes and Stealth with Jamie Fox) to address a growing threat: Nazi Zombies. They are on the rise and threatening to rip away not just our way of life but our basic human rights. Mainly, the right of not having our flesh gnawed on by the soulless undead.
In recent years, the threat of zombie armageddon has been steadily encroaching on our culture. The best and brightest have saturated the media with warnings. In 1968, George Romero was the first to speak against the festering menace with his documentary The Night of the Living Dead, in which seven people in a small town in Pennsylvania attempt to fend off the first documented zombie attack.
Obviously, official government policy is to deny the event ever happened. Bureaucrats denote such occurrences as "fiction" and call those who investigate them “crazy,” yet more and more people have released their tales of zombie survival. From Sam Raimi’s classic Evil Dead series to the newly popular 28 Days Later, awareness of the undead pandemic is spreading. Even written account have reached publication. Max Brooks’ World War Z recounts the testimonials of several of those who were cunning, determined, or plain lucky enough to survive the Zombie apocalypse.
Still, these tales pale in comparison to the greatest zombie threat to date. I speak of course, of the Nazi Zombie.
This is a game changer. While once we were faced only with creatures who may have once been friends or neighbors, now we face war criminals and men who were likely monsters before they became undead. It’s a development that can cause the novice to zombie combat additional fear and skepticism. Few things are more terrifying than a German SS bearing down after taking three rounds to the chest while chowing down on the remains of PVC Riley (poor bastard), it's dead lifeless eyes looking to you for the next meal that fails to satiate its undead hunger.
One thing is clear, regardless of what type of zombie horde you face, the only way to ensure survival when they begin to overrun society is to be prepared. Always have a reserve supply of food and a fortified place to hold up until the walking dead pass by. Keep yourself fit so you can out pace the slow moving rotting corpses. Conserve your ammo and practice your aiming. Body shots are useless, take out the brain and you take down the zombie.
But these are just a few tips. Not enough to guarantee you’ll live to help me rebuild society. Mainly, you must do your research. It’s important to watch the accounts of other survivors and their friends who didn’t make it. What did those survivors do right? What did their friends do wrong? And check out the The Zombie Survival Guide or this wiki. Above all, stay alive, humanity needs you.
Last Fall, Eric C ran across a passage in The Moon is Down that captured his thoughts so well, he just posted it straight up. The conclusions of The Ugly American (you can read Monday's review here) made me feel the exact same way.
In The Ugly American, Ambassador to Sarkhan Gilbert MacWhite lays out six conditions he demands of every foreign service officer traveling to the fictional country of Sarkhan. Change some of the words from Sarkhan to Afghanistan, and you have what I believe would be six fantastic ideas for counter-insurgents abroad:
1. I request that every American (and his dependents) sent to Sarkhan be required to be able to both read and speak Sarkhanese. I am satisfied that if the motivation is high enough, any person can learn enough of the language in twelve weeks so that he can get along. This should be required of both military and civilian personnel.
2. I request that no American employee be allowed to bring his dependents to Sarkhan unless he is willing to serve here for at least two years. If he does bring his family, it should be with the understanding they will not be given luxurious quarters, but will live in housing which is normal to the area; their housing should certainly not be more luxurious than they are able to afford in America. They should also subsist on foods available in local stores--which are wholesome and ample.
3. I request that the American commissary and PX be withdrawn from Sarkhan, and that no American supplies be sold except for toilet articles, baby food, canned milk, coffee, and tobacco.
4. I request that Americans not be allowed to bring their private automobiles to this country. All of our official transportation should be done in official automobiles. Private transportation should be taxi, pedicab, or bicycle.
5. I request that all Americans serving in Sarkhan, regardless of their classification, be required to read books by Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, Chou En-lai, Marx, Engels, and leading Asian Communists. This reading should be done before arrival. [Editorial note: This is an anachronistic holdover between capitalism and communism, but they totally apply to knowing your enemy.]
6. I request that in our current recruiting program we make all of these conditions clear to any prospective government employee, so that he comes here with no illusions. It has been my experience that superior people are attracted only by challenge. By setting our standards low and making our life soft, we have, quite automatically and unconsciously, assured ourselves of mediocre people.
And now my thoughts:
Now, obviously some of these would only work metaphorically, and some would work literally. The important point is that at the time of printing, in 1958, these ideas were radical. They still are today.
For example, virtually every Soldier spends an hour each day conducting physical fitness. Soldiers are tested twice a year in the Army Physical Fitness Test, and their results are put in evaluation reports, and rewarded with medals in some cases. Yet virtually no unit studies languages regularly, and testing for languages is voluntary, even with units about to deploy.
Points 2, 3, and 4 don't apply directly, (no Soldiers or Marines bring their dependents to Afghanistan or Iraq) but the principle does. We deploy in relative luxury. We have access to DVDs, air conditioning, and some Super-FOBs have Burger King. Compared to the immense poverty of the surrounding countryside of Afghanistan, this is just insulting. If Afghan Soldiers can get away without AC, our Soldiers should. We should live like Afghans, the way insurgents, and good counter-insurgents, do.
Overall, the demand for luxury is a loss of focus on the mission. Much has been made of General Stanley McChrystal’s spartan living habits in Afghanistan. I have a feeling this comes from an understanding that luxury like gourmet coffee, steak and shrimp dinners, basketball tournaments, and salsa night do not contribute to mission success.
Which rule would you like to see America implement for better COIN?
After President John F. Kennedy read the novel The Ugly American, inspiration struck, and he decided to have every senior State Department official, and every single American military officer, read the book.
Unfortunately, he never gave the order, because he didn't believe the officials and officers would actually read the book. (This story is one of legend, otherwise we would link to it.) Fortunately, The Ugly American, by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, hasn't gone away.
It is as relevant today as it was when it was first printed, before the Vietnam war (which it predicted). The Ugly American captures the essence of unconventional warfare in fiction. Or, in On Violence terms, it describes political war; it should still be read by all American military officers.
The authors originally set out to write a series of non-fiction accounts of State Department officials in southeast Asia based off their personal experience in the region. As they developed their stories, they realized that only fiction could capture the zany reality they saw. So they created a southeast Asian nation, Sarkhan, and the diplomats, politicians, and military officers stationed there. The Ugly American is a series of interconnected short stories about Americans trying to influence Sarkhan while both communists and capitalists try to consolidate power.
This struggle is not a war between nation states, but the struggle of competing ideas. The book's struggle of ideas--capitalism versus communism-- mirrors today's battle between extreme Islam and Western democracy. Unlike state war, the political war in The Ugly American follows different rules.
As a Philippino diplomat describes it on page 109, “I know that you’re a diplomat and that warfare is not supposed to be your game; but you’ll discover soon enough out here that statesmanship, diplomacy, economics, and warfare just can’t be separated from one another.” The intersection of diplomacy, economics and warfare might as well be ripped from General Petraeus’ Field Manual on counter-insurgency.
And while the book as a whole capture the interconnectedness of warfare, the individual stories themselves shine. They tell the stories of ambassadors--good and bad, American, Russian and Asian-- military leaders, politicians, and most importantly “ugly Americans.” The best part of the novel is that the "ugly American" of the title is the most influential in Sarkhan.
His name is Homer Atkins. He provides only simple engineering insight, but does so in a way that the native Sarkhanese adopt the ideas wholeheartedly. Homer Atkins doesn’t care about living lavishly, he learns the local language, and he genuinely cares about the people of Sarkhan, not just the threats against America.
In another story, we hear about an Air Force Colonel named Hillendale, probably an intelligence officer, who manages to influence massive numbers of Sarkhanese without really trying. He sings songs, reads palms, and eats food with them. (He also knows the language, a point that occurs over and over. I wrote about it a few weeks ago and last summer.) Most importantly, he uses hardly any money while he influences people.
The lessons of Homer Atkins and Colonel Hillendale are just two of many. The most important lesson, and why all current and future military officers should read this novel, is because it persuasively describes political war. (Also, while I have been insanely positive in today's post, on Wednesday I will provide some of the downsides of this thoroughly enjoyable novel.)
And if he hasn't read The Ugly American, I would advise President Barack Obama to read it too. Hopefully he finishes the job President Kennedy started, making all military officers and State Department officials read this novel. (Although, I bet 90% of officers wouldn’t even if the president told them to.)
(To read the entire "War Memoirs" series, please click here.)
When I first started this “war memoirs project," I wrote a quick litmus test of things that, if the memoirist were being totally honest about war, they would include in the memoir. I want to read war memoirs (and literature as a whole) that include the things that haunt the writer when they go to sleep.
At the top of that list I wrote “killing dogs.” By extension, I meant all animals. Of the many things war destroys, one of the most evocative and symbolically powerful is the deliberate or unintended deaths of dogs.
If you're human, you’ve probably already had a negative reaction. Andy Rooney, in his memoir My War, describes it perfectly: “I knew as I was thinking how sad animals were in war, that it was a misplaced emotion for me to have with human beings dying in every way on every side, but nonetheless I kept feeling bad about unmilked cows, homeless horses, abandoned dogs...most of them got no help from humans concerned mostly with staying alive themselves.”
This is a powerful image, a war-zone filled with bloated horse carcasses eaten by homeless dogs. But like all war, the ugly is balanced (but not overcome) by the beautiful. Soldiers raised in rural areas try to milk the cows when they can, and “every wandering dog was adopted and fed by some GI.” Soldiers love dogs, and as we wrote last week on The Best Defense, many platoons and companies in Afghanistan or Iraq have, at some point, had a company or platoon pet.
So the best writers know to use dogs in their stories. This is why the single best image from the recent war memoirs is of a horse, running wild in the Shahi-kot valley, miraculously surviving bomb blasts for days on end in The War I Always Wanted.
It’s why the best scene in Jarhead involves the pre-war shooting of a Bedouin camel.
It’s why Nathaniel Fick doesn’t mention dogs in his memoir, but in Generation Kill a Sergeant has to tell his Marines they won’t be shooting any dogs.
It’s why the medic Rat Kiley shoots and tortures a baby water buffalo after a land mine kills his friend Curtis Lemon.
It’s why Lone Survivor, The Unforgiving Minute, and One Bullet Away all feel like they are missing something from their accounts of war.
In this post I don’t have room to explain why the death of animals evokes the deepest of emotions. But let it suffice to say it matters, and the best reporters, writers, and memoirists write about the animals in war.